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ABSTRACT
We analyze the eects of land market restrictions on the rural labor market outcomes for
women. The existing literature emphasizes two mechanisms through which land restrictions can
aect the economic outcomes: the collateral value of land, and (in)security of property rights.
Our analysis focuses on an alternative mechanism where land restrictions increase costs of mi-
gration out of villages. The testable prediction of collateral eect is that both wage and labor
force participation move in the same direction, and insecurity of property rights reduces labor
force participation, and increases wage. In contrast, if land restrictions work primarily through
higher migration costs, labor force participation increases, while wage declines. For identication,
we exploit a natural experiment in Sri Lanka where historical malaria played a unique role in
land policy. We provide robust evidence of a positive eect of land restrictions on women's labor
force participation, but a negative eect on female wages. The empirical results thus contra-
dict a collateral or insecure property rights eect, but supports migration costs as the primary
mechanism.
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(1) Introduction
There is a growing literature in economics that analyzes the eects of restrictions on land
market on household choices and outcomes. The literature has focused on the eects of restrictions
on the alienability of land on credit access, labor supply, agricultural productivity, and savings
(see, for example, Field (2007), Iyer at al. (2009)), and on the eects of uncertainty about property
rights on incentives to invest (see, for example, Besley (1995), Jacoby et al. (2002), Goldstein
and Udry (2008)). This paper deals with a set of issues that have largely been ignored in the
economics literature: the eects of restrictions on sales and rental on the labor force participation
of rural women and their wages.
The eects of insecure property rights to land on women's labor market are well-recognized
in the literature; reforms that improve security of property rights can lead to higher labor supply
by women, as they do not need guard labor (Field, 2007). Formalized alienable property rights
in land can potentially create collateral value and better access to credit (de Soto, 1989). Policy
restrictions on sales and rental may create insecurity, and destroy the collateral value of land, as
the banks cannot claim the land in case of a default.
The literature has, however, so far largely neglected another important channel through which
sales and rental restrictions may aect women's labor force participation and wages in a village:
rural-urban migration.2 As emphasized recently by Hayashi and Prescott (2008), land market
restrictions increase costs of migration substantially as a household loses the income stream from
the land when it decides to leave the village. We explore the implications of the migration
channel, both theoretically and empirically, and contrast it with the predictions of the more
widely-recognized collateral and property rights channels.
To understand the workings of the migration mechanism, we develop a model that focuses on
women's traditional role in producing home goods for labor force participation decision, and the
land market restrictions imply that a household loses the land in the event of out-migration from
the village.3 It is straightforward to see that higher migration costs are likely to reduce migration
2We use \urban" as a short for any destination which includes international migration.
3The standard model of labor-leisure trade-o can be seen as a special case of our model where the home goods
production function is CRTS: one unit of labor produces one unit of leisure. Note that in our model, home goods
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and lower the equilibrium wage rate in the local labor market. The eects of land restrictions on
women's propensity of labor force participation are, however, not obvious; it depends on whether
the women who stay back in the village at the margin are more or less likely to participate in
the labor force compared to an average rural woman before land restrictions. Since a household
is more likely to benet from the higher wages in urban labor market when it uses only a small
proportion of its labor endowment in home goods production, propensity to migrate is a negative
function of productivity in home goods production. An important result from our analysis is
that the set of women whose migration status is changed by land restrictions are the ones with
highest productivity among the migrants in the initial equilibrium, but they have the lowest
productivity compared to the women who chose not to migrate without the land restrictions.
This also implies that these women are more likely to participate in the labor force compared
to an average rural woman. Imposition of land restrictions thus increases women's propensity of
labor force participation in a village.4 The resulting higher labor supply to the market reduces
the wage rate.
We thus have predictions from three dierent mechanisms that can mediate the eects of
land market restrictions. Insecure rights imply higher wage and lower labor force participation, a
collateral eect implies that wage and labor force participation move in the same direction, and a
higher migration cost yields the prediction that wages go down, but participation goes up. These
contrasting predictions allow us to discriminate among these three alternative mechanisms.
To identify and estimate the eects of land market restrictions on women's labor force par-
ticipation and wage, we take advantage of a historical natural experiment in Sri Lanka where
the cross-section variations in the incidence of land restrictions across dierent sub-districts (i.e.,
proportion of land under policy restrictions) were primarily determined by historical malaria
prevalence (endemicity) through its eects on `crown land'. Historical malaria caused an exodus
of households from the aected areas during the 13-18th centuries, and the abandoned land was
include many more things such as child bearing and rearing, home schooling, meal preparation, house care, and
tending to kitchen garden.
4Interpreting the increased labor force participation in rural areas as a sign of women's economic mobility may,
however, not be appropriate, as the increased labor force participation in rural areas comes at the expense of
migration and better jobs in urban areas.
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taken over by the government during the colonial period and designated as crown land (Peebles
(2006), De Silva (1981)). The crown land was later distributed through settlements, and restric-
tions on sales, mortgage and rental were imposed. The historical malaria thus is signicantly
correlated with the extent of land restrictions in an area through the availability of crown land.
We exploit this correlation between historical malaria and the incidence of land restrictions in a
sub-district to identify the causal eects of land restrictions. To be more precise, we rely on the
interaction of historical malaria and average rainfall across dierent sub-districts for identication
in an empirical model with district xed eects. This approach uses subdistrict level rainfall as
weights to uncover variations in malaria across subdistricts from the district level average esti-
mates available from Newman (1965) (see the discussion on empirical strategy in section 4 below).
This strategy is motivated by two considerations. First, the variation in land restrictions in the
data is at the subdistrict level and the interaction of district level malaria with the subdistrict
level rainfall provides an instrument that varies across subdistricts. Second, a large literature
shows that rainfall is one of the most important determinants of spatial variations in malaria in
Sri Lanka; the malaria incidence is lower in a subdistrict within a district if it has higher rainfall
((Clemesha, 1934; Rustomjee, 1944; Briet et al, 2008). As we discuss in detail later, we control
for rainfall in a subdistrict in the regressions to ensure that the exclusion restriction imposed is
credible. In addition, the interpretation that the interaction of historical malaria with subdistrict
rainfall provides an estimate of historical malaria variations across subdistricts implies testable
sign restriction in the rst stage regression, which is borne out by the empirical results reported
later. The strength of our identication strategy derives from the following observations: (i) the
timing of the malaria eradication program was determined by the technological breakthrough
abroad for tackling malaria (DDT), and thus can plausibly be treated as exogenous,5 (ii) a suc-
cessful nationwide malaria eradication program was implemented in Sri Lanka in 1947; malaria
endemicity (as measured by enlarged spleen rates) fell close to zero by 1950-51.6 We thus rely
5Although DDT was rst synthesized in 1874, its insecticidal properties were discovered in 1939 by Swiss scientist
Paul H Muller. It was widely used during second World War to control malaria and typhus, and after the war DDT
was made available as an agricultural pesticide and for malaria eradication programs.
6Reported malaria cases in Sri Lanka were reduced from about 3 million per year during pre-eradication era to
only 29 in 1964 (Harrison, 1978). The number of malaria death cases were 30 in 2002 among a population of 21
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on historical malaria more than half a century ago to identify the eects of land restrictions, and
(iii) most of the current population in a subdistrict ravaged by high historical malaria were never
exposed to historical malaria there, as they were resettled from other relatively malaria free areas.
A number of possible objections to the identication scheme and evidence on their relevance are
discussed in detail later in the paper (please see section 4.3 below).
The empirical results show that the incidence of land market restrictions has a numerically and
statistically signicant negative eect on the wages. More interestingly, the eects on women's
labor force participation is positive: a one percentage point increase in the land under policy
restrictions in a sub-district leads to about a 2.3 percent increase in the labor force participation
of women (evaluated at the mean). The corresponding estimates for wages imply that a one
percentage point increase in land under restrictions leads to a 1.7 percent decrease in female
wage. The results on wages thus reject the hypothesis that land restrictions aect women's labor
market because of insecurity of rights to land. The results on labor force participation on the other
hand contradict the collateral channel. The evidence on both wages and labor force participation
is consistent with the predictions from the model developed in this paper that focuses on higher
migration costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple model to understand
the eects of land market restrictions on women in rural labor markets that focuses on migration
costs and women's traditional role in home production. Section 3 discusses data and variables
denitions. Section 4 lays out the identication approach we use. Section 5, arranged in a
number of subsections, report the results of the empirical analysis. The paper ends with some
concluding remarks.
2. Land Market Restrictions, Migration, and Women's Labor Market:
Theory
We develop a simple model of wage determination that incorporates higher migration costs
due to land restrictions. The labor force participation is determined by shadow value of labor in
million. The reported malaria death were 4 in 2003, and 0 in 2005.
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home production that includes, among other things, child bearing and rearing, home making, meal
preparation, homework help for kids. As noted earlier, the home good can also be interpreted as
leisure.
The Basic Set-up
Each household owns L amount of female labor, but they dier in terms of land endowment.
Household i owns Hi = 0 amount of land. There are two goods: a home good (denotes as d good),
and an agricultural good (denoted as a good). We assume that the agricultural good is traded
beyond the village and its price is normalized to 1, i.e., P a = 1. The household can produce
the agricultural good in its own land and can buy from the market if it earns wage income. The
agricultural production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form with CRTS:
Qa = F (H;La) = H (La)1 
The technology for home goods production is household specic which generates heterogeneity
in labor force participation (i.e., labor supply to market activities, either own farming, or wage
labor):7
Qdi =

Ld
i
A household consumes two goods (home good and agricultural good) and the utility function
is:
Ui = Ln

C
d
i

+ Cai
The utility function captures the idea that women perform some necessary home production
7We thank an anonymous referee for noting the importance of heterogeneity in labor force participation in our
analysis. Women's labor force participation may partly depend on other factors not captured in the simple model
here. For example, educated women are, in general, more likely to participate in the labor force and labor market,
because of skill premium earned in the labor market. We chose not to focus on the heterogeneity in human capital
as a driving force in labor force participation for the sake of both realism and tractability. In a model with education
and skill heterogeneity, education also will be relevant for migration decisions and labor market equilibrium will be
characterized by a vector of wages reecting skill premium for dierent levels of education. The model thus becomes
substantially more complex without generating important new insights about the eects of land restrictions in our
context.
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before participating in the labor force, and households increase their consumption of market
goods as income increases (a variant of Engel's Law). A quasilinear utility function also simplies
the algebra for the corner solution needed to derive non-participation in the labor force as an
optimizing outcome for some women. Although we cast the household heterogeneity in terms of
productivity dierences, all the results below hold if instead the heterogeneity is in the preference
for home good, i.e., if i 6= j but i =  8i .
Household Optimization In the Absence of Land Restrictions
A household i maximizes the following utility function by allocating its xed labor endowment
across three alternatives: home goods production, own farming, and wage labor.
MaxLdi ;Lai
Ui = Ln

C
d
i

+ Cai
where
Cdi = Q
d
i
Cai = Q
a
i + w0
 
L  Ldi   Lai

Solving the rst order conditions we have the following labor allocation:
Lai =

Hi (1  )
w0
1

Ldi =
i
w0
(1)
So woman from a household i will devote all her labor to home good production, and thus
will not participate in the labor force, if the following holds:8
Ldi  L =) i 


w0L (2)
The condition for woman from a household to participate in the labor force, but not in the
8Note that we do not impose concavity on the production function for home good, i.e., it is possible to have
i > 1 in this model.
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labor market is given by:
i 3 Ldi < L and Ldi + Lai  L (3)
Denote the indirect utility function for household i residing in the rural area as V R (::), then
we have:
V Ri (Hi; L; i; w0) = iLnL
d
i + 
h
Qai + w0

L  Ldi   Lai
i
(4)
where Ldi and L
a
i are given in equation (1) above as function of endowment, technology and
prices.
Migration Decision without Land Restrictions
A woman from household i has the option to migrate to the urban area where the wage is higher
wu > w0, but migration also entails some costs denoted as  which may include monetary and
non-monetary costs. Without any restrictions in the land market, we assume that the household
can be an absentee landlord, and can earn the prot generated by the land by renting out the
land (say through a xed rent contract). In general, the absentee landlord would bear costs of
monitoring and enforcement, but we will mostly ignore such costs for the sake of simplicity and
to focus on the costs that arise from sales and rental restrictions.
The optimization decision facing household i after it migrates to the urban area is as follows:
MaxLdi ;Lai
Ui = LnC
d
i + C
a
i
where
Cdi = Q
d
i
Cai = wu
 
L  Ldi

+ai
where ai (Hi; w0) = Q
a
i (Hi; w0)  w0Lai (Hi; w0) is the prot from land Hiusing only hired
labor at wage rate w0.
Denote the indirect utility for household i in the urban areas (without taking into account of
migration costs) as V Ui (Hi; L; i; wu). Then woman from household i will migrate to the urban
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area only when the following holds:
V Ui (Hi; L; i; wu)    V Ri (HiL; ; i; w0) (5)
Two immediate results follow from the above migration condition: (i) migration decision
depends on the productivity of home work, households with high enough value of i will not nd
it optimal to migrate; and (ii) land ownership does not have any implications for the migration
decision. To see the rst result, consider the household k such that the following holds: k 


wuL. The productivity of home good is high enough for this household so that the woman does
not participate in the labor market after migrating to the urban area, which also implies that she
does not participate in the labor force while being a rural resident (because w0 < wu). For the
household k, migration thus entails a net welfare loss of ; intuitively, a higher wage in urban
area is not relevant for her because she does not sell any labor to the market when facing the
higher wage in the urban area. The threshold productivity level above which a household does
not nd it desirable to migrate is denoted by ^0, dened by the following:
wu
n
L  Ldi

^0; wu
o
  w0
n
L  Ldi

^0; w0
o
=  (6)
The left hand side in equation (6) shows the net gain in labor income arising from migration,
and the threshold value equates the benets with the costs of migration . Note, however, that
the second result about irrelevance of landownership for migration is driven by our assumption
that there are no monitoring costs for an absentee landlord. As noted before, in general, an
absentee landlord will incur monitoring costs that depend on the amount of labor hired. In that
case, the costs of migration will be higher than  and would include the loss of prot due to
monitoring costs leading to a lower threshold value of productivity above which a household nd
it undesirable to migrate.
Eects of Imposition of Land Restrictions
Restrictions on alienability and transferability of land, for example, ban on sales and rental of
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land is expected to aect the migration decision because the household eectively loses the land
and the associated income (prot), as emphasized by Hayashi and Prescott (2008), among others.
The migration condition in this case becomes:
V Ui (0; L; i; wu)    V Ri (Hi; L; i; w0) (7)
where we set Hi = 0 in the urban (post migration) case implying that the household loses its
rural land once it moves to the urban areas. Two important implications of the migration condition
under land market restrictions deserve attention. First, given a positive land endowment, the
threshold of productivity above which a household nds migration undesirable is lower than ^0,
because for Hi > 0, V
U
i (0; L; i; wu) < V
U
i (Hi; L; i; wu). Second, land ownership now matters
for migration decision; for a given productivity level , a household is less likely to migrate if it
owns enough land so that the loss in prot outweighs the gain in wage income due to higher wages
in urban areas. What is more important for our analysis is that land restrictions increase the
probability that a randomly chosen woman in the village under land restrictions will participate
in the labor force (in market activities, either own farming or wage labor). To see this, consider
the households in an arbitrary land ownership category ~H, and denote the productivity threshold
above which households do not migrate under land restrictions by ^1( ~H), determined as follows:
V Ui

~H;L; ^1; wu

   = V Ri

~H;L; ^1; w0

(8)
Since ^1( ~H) < ^0, the woman who are induced to stay back in the village after the imposition of
land restrictions are the ones with i 2

^1( ~H); ^0

, i.e., they have less productivity in home goods
production than the households that chose not to migrate before the restrictions. If there is at least
one woman j who participates in the labor force without land restrictions, L  Ldj

^0; w0

> 0,
then all of the women that stay back in the village because of land restrictions also participate in
the labor force. The upshot of the above analysis is that the probability that a randomly drawn
woman will participate in the labor force is higher in the villages under land restrictions.
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Land Market Restrictions and Village Wage Rate
The analysis so far ignores any eects of land restrictions on wage rate in the village. But when
land restrictions aect many households in a village, we would expect it to alter the wage rate in
the village labor market. To keep the exposition as simple as possible, we ignore the heterogeneity
in land ownership and assume every household owns ~H > 0 amount of land. Denoting the CDF of
productivity by F (), the labor market clearing condition without land restrictions can be written
as:
LTS =

^0
h
L  Ldi (; w0)
i
dF () = LTD
 
HT ; w0

(9)
where LTD
 
HT ; w0

is the total demand for labor in the village (own farming and market
demand) at wage rate w0.
9 The imposition of land restrictions reduces the productivity threshold
and also the equilibrium wage rate so that the local labor market clearing and the migration
equilibrium conditions are simultaneously satised. Denote the new productivity threshold as e1
and the corresponding equilibrium wage as fw1, then we have the following:
LTS =

e1
h
L  Ldi (;fw1)i dF () = LTD  HT ;fw1 (10)
V Ui

~H; e1; wfu   = V Ri  ~H; e1;fw1 (11)
A comparison of market clearing with and without land restrictions makes it clear that the
equilibrium wage rate in the village labor market has to be lower after the imposition of restric-
tions, but the number of women who nd it desirable to stay back because of land restrictions is
smaller than the simple partial equilibrium case considered above with a xed local wage w0. In
9We can treat the demand side as a single agent problem given that the technology is CRTS and there is no
productivity heterogeneity in agriculture across households.
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other words, we have the following relations:
fw1 < w0; e1 > ^1
A competitive land market equilibrium determines the rental rate once the labor endowment
is pinned down by local labor market clearing and migration conditions in (10) nd (11) above.
Given the CRTS technology in agriculture, the land rental rate (denoted as R) is given by the
marginal productivity of land in the aggregate production function:
R =
@Qa
 
HT ; LTS (fw1)
@H
Proposition 1
Assume that (i) in the initial equilibrium without land restrictions, at least one woman participates
in the labor force, and (ii) a household loses the land if it migrates after the land restrictions. The
imposition of land restrictions in a village would lead to a decline in the village wage rate, but a
higher probability of women's labor force participation.
In rest of the paper, we test the predictions from proposition 1 using data from and a policy
experiment in Sri Lanka, and contrast them with the predictions from the collateral and insecure
property rights mechanisms.
3. Data and Variables Denitions
The main data source for the estimation of the female labor force participation and wages is
the Household Income and Expenditure Survey, 2002 (HIES, 2002) of Sir Lanka. We use the rural
sub-sample of HIES 2002. The HIES 2002 collected information from a nationally representative
sample of 16,924 households drawn from 1913 primary sampling units. The survey covered 17
of Sri Lanka's 25 districts, and 249 of its 322 Divisional Secretariat Divisions (DSDs).10 From
the 16,924 households in the survey, about 17140 females are in working age group (25 to 65
10Data collection in the North and Eastern provinces was not possible due to on-going civil conicts at the time
of survey eld work.
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years). To dene our sample, we used two criteria: (i) we excluded age groups which may have
been exposed to historical malaria that aicted Sri Lanka before 1950; (ii) we focused on the
rural sample. Note that the rural sample does not include any household that has moved to
urban areas with all the members, but the split households where some members stay behind
in the village are part of the sample. The number of adult females who were born after 1950
and are currently residing in rural areas is 10,850. The sample for the wage regressions are,
however, smaller. Among females in our main sample (10850), 42 percent are employed. About
a third of those employed are self-employed. We have thus complete information on wages and
other relevant variables for 2918 females who were born after 1950 and live in rural areas. The
dependent variable in wage regression is deated using region specic consumer price index.
A key piece of information for our analysis is the amount of land under LDO restrictions in a
DSD. We draw this information from the Agricultural Census of 1998. We estimated percentage
of agricultural land under LDO leases (including permits and grants). The DSD identiers in the
HIES (2002) and Agricultural Census allow us to merge individual level data from HIES 2002
with data on percentage of land under LDO leases from Agricultural census. The geographic
information including travel time from surveyed DSDs to major urban centers with population
of 100 thousand or more are drawn from the Geographical Information System (GIS) database.
The travel time is estimated using the existing road network and allowing dierent travel speed
on dierent types of roads.
A critical variable for our instrumental variables analysis is the historical district level malaria
prevalence rate. The data on historical malaria prevalence are taken from Newman (1965). The
measure for malaria prevalence used in this paper is called Gabaldon's endemicity index (see
column 2 in Table 4, P.34, Newman, 1965). This index is based on the estimates of enlarged
spleens in children due to malaria, and is a good indicator of the degree to which malaria is high
and permanent in a district. However, we need a measure of malaria variations at the subdistrict
level because the land restrictions vary at that level in the data. Also, we rely on district xed
eects in the IV regressions reported below in section 5 to control for unobserved land and labor
productivity dierences. Our approach to constructing an instrument that represents historical
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sub-district level malaria incidence is to nd exogenous sub-district characteristic(s) that can
essentially be used as \weights to recover the variations in malaria prevalence across dierent
sub-districts from the district average malaria data. A large literature on malaria in tropical
countries identify a few ecological characteristics that can potentially be used to generate the
sub-district level historical malaria estimates. Among the candidate ecological variables, rainfall
is perhaps the most reliable predictor of spatial malaria variation in the specic context of Sri
Lanka (Briet et al., 2003, 2008). We thus use rainfall in a sub-district as the relevant exogenous
characteristic to uncover the incidence of historical malaria across sub-districts. The eects
of rainfall on the incidence of malaria, however, can be dierent in dierent countries.11 In Sri
Lanka, the relationship between malaria and rainfall is negative across geographic space, as higher
rainfall washes out the breeding grounds of Anopheles Culicifacies, and Anopheles Subpictus, the
main malaria vectors in Sri Lanka (Clemesha, 1934; Rustomjee, 1944; Briet et al., 2008). An
interaction of rainfall with historical malaria is used as an instrument in our empirical analysis.
As we discuss in the empirical strategy below, all regressions control for rainfall directly to capture
any productivity eect of rainfall.
The HIES 2002 also collected information on education, age, gender, ethnicity and religion.
The individual and household level explanatory variables are dened from the HIES 2002. HIES
2002 however did not collect information on health status of the household members. We draw
information on the chronic illness of household heads from HIES2006 data (Table A.20, p.99
in the nal report on HIES 2006/7). The information on anemia prevalence rate among non-
pregnant women is drawn from Demographic and Health Survey 2006/7 (Table 6, p.19, DHS
report (2009)).12 The area characteristics including rainfall, slope, area and land quality are
drawn from various GIS data sources. Appendix Table A.1 provides summary statistics for all
variable included in our analysis.
Among 10850 women in our main sample, 51 percent participated in the labor force, with
11Many researchers in Asia found that rainfall reduces malaria incidence/prevalence by washing out the breeding
grounds of Anopheles mosquito (Wijesundera, 1988.)
12Anemia status was determined by haemoglobin level in blood. Anyone with haemoglobin level below 7.0g/dl
is classied as severely anemic, and with haemoglobin level between 7.0-10.p g/dl classied as having moderate to
mild anemia.
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42 percent employed and another 8.65 percent unemployed but seeking jobs. Though Sri Lanka
has a higher per capita income compared with rest of the South Asian countries, labor force
participation rate in Sri Lanka (51 percent) is somewhat larger than that in India (around 34
percent) but smaller than that in two poorest countries Bangladesh (57 percent) and Nepal (58
percent) (Chaudhuri, 2010). As opposed to other South Asian countries where work migration
among women is very limited due to social and cultural norms, Sri Lankan women are quite mobile
in search of jobs. For instance, about half of all emigrant workers in Sri Lanka are women (about
2.5 million women) and a large fraction of garment workers { the most important manufacturing
{ are also women who migrated from rural areas (Ukwatta, 2003). In the following section, we
discuss our empirical strategy.
4. Empirical Strategy
The core identication challenge is that the dierent sub-districts may dier systematically in
observed and unobserved dimensions, and when the unobserved characteristics are correlated with
both the incidence of land restrictions and the outcome variables across dierent sub-districts,
it may lead to omitted variables bias. The sources of omitted variables bias are likely to be
unobserved labor and land productivity heterogeneity.
4.1 Possible Sources of Bias
It is common for governments to impose restrictions on sales of land in settlement areas, and
settlement usually takes place in low quality marginal land. Also, historically private property
rights emerge rst in high productivity land. As a result, when we observe land under private
property rights to coexist with land under government restrictions, the land under restrictions
in general turns out to be of lower quality. A second important issue is the labor productivity
heterogeneity. Since lands under policy restrictions in Sri Lanka are mainly settlement lands, one
might worry that the people who were brought to these lands are of lower productivity due to
adverse human capital characteristics. Evidence from Sri Lanka however shows that land and
labor productivity is higher in areas under land policy restrictions.
Crop yield is a good summary statistic for land and labor productivity of an area. Crop
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yields are found to be higher in land under policy restrictions for a number of dierent crops
including rice, the main crop in Sri Lanka ( please see Table 1 for details). There is no evidence of
adverse health conditions in areas under land restrictions. The correlations between two indicators
of health status { incidence of chronic illness and disability, and percentage of non-pregnant
women suering from dierent degrees of anemia { with proportion of land under restrictions
are statistically insignicant and mostly bear negative signs (please see Table 2). The higher
land productivity in areas under land restrictions are outcomes of Sri Lanka government's heavy
investment in irrigation development in resettled areas. Similarly investments in health, education
and social services across the entire country successfully eliminated regional dierences in the labor
productivity outcomes as well (Sen, 1981).
Higher productivity in a subdistrict, however, does not have unambiguous eects on women's
labor force participation and wage, because it can have conicting eects on the demand and
supply sides of the labor market. On the demand side, higher land/labor productivity increases
marginal productivity of labor and thus raises demand for labor and equilibrium wages. How-
ever, higher land quality also implies higher income for the land owning households which can
reduce labor force participation (and labor supply) by women when work outside the home is
associated with social stigma (Goldin (1995)). The bias from unobserved land and labor quality
thus depends on the net eect: if the labor demand shift due to higher productivity dominates,
the OLS estimates will tend to overestimate the eects of land restrictions on women's labor force
participation (because the causal eect is positive according to the theory), and underestimate
their eects on wage (because the causal eect is negative according to the theory).
Another potentially important issue is measurement error in the land restrictions variable
and the resulting `attenuation bias'. Thus the OLS estimates of the eects on both labor force
participation and equilibrium wages are likely to be biased toward zero.
4.2 Historical Malaria as a Natural Experiment
To estimate the eects of land restrictions on women's labor force participation and wage,
we need to nd a source of exogenous variation in the incidence of land restrictions in dierent
sub-districts. The unique role played by malaria infestation starting from 13th century till early
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twentieth century in the history of land policy of Sri Lanka oers such an exogenous source of vari-
ations. The areas aected by historical malaria endemicity witnessed exodus of population and
abandonment of land (De Silva (1981)). The abandoned land was taken over by the government
and designated as `crown land' during the colonial period. The crown land was later distributed
after the independence in 1948 under Land Development Ordinance of 1935, and restrictions on
sales, mortgage, and rental were imposed (henceforth called LDO restrictions). Since the amount
of crown land available in a sub-district was historically determined by the intensity of malaria,
the historical malaria incidence created exogenous variations in the incidence of land restrictions
in a sub-district; the proportion of land under restrictions is higher in a sub-district, the higher
was the intensity of historical malaria prevalence.13
An important part of our empirical strategy is to use district xed eects to control for time-
invariant land and labor productivity factors which are the main sources of omitted variables bias.
This precludes the use of district level malaria variation for identication. More important, we need
an instrument that can provide variations at the subdistrict level to explain the incidence of land
restrictions which varies across dierent subdistricts. Also, the district average is likely to smooth
out a large part of the identifying variation in historical malaria across dierent subdistricts, and
thus may result in weak instrument problem. This is important because there were signicant
variation in the historical malaria endemicity across dierent sub-districts within the same district.
For example, in Jana district, the Jana city was almost malaria free while the south Jana
suered from severe malaria in early 1930s (Newman (1965), p. 35). To uncover this variation
across sub-districts in a district, we exploit the correlation between rainfall and malaria by using
interaction of these two terms as instrument. As discussed in the data and variables section above
(section 3), rainfall is one of the most important exogenous ecological determinant of malaria in
Sri Lanka, and the higher the rainfall in a subdistrict (DSD) in a district, the lower is the
malaria incidence compared to the other DSDs in the district, because rainfall washes away the
13One potential worry is that the households facing historical malaria might have abandoned land selectively
which can create a negative correlation between the extent of land restrictions in a sub-district and its land quality,
because one would expect a household to abandon the low quality lands rst. However, as discussed earlier, the
lands under the restrictions are of higher quality, which implies that we do not need to worry about such selective
land abandonment. We thank Michael Clemens for raising this point.
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breeding grounds (standing waters in ponds, canals, marshes etc.) of the main malaria vectors
(see, for example, the discussion on the eects of rainfall on historical malaria in (Clemesha,
1934; Rustomjee, 1944). Thus the interaction of district level malaria estimate with DSD level
rainfall in the rst stage regression of the incidence of land restrictions that includes district xed
eects will have a negative sign, if the interaction in fact represents variation in historical malaria
across DSDs. This a priori sign restriction is useful for our identication strategy, because one
might worry that the interaction represents primarily variation in productivity due to rainfall
dierences across DSDs, instead of variations in historical malaria across DSDs within a district.
Note that we directly control for rainfall in the regressions, but if our instrument is still picking
up productivity eects of rainfall, we would nd a positive coecient on the interaction of malaria
and rainfall at the DSD level in the rst stage regressions. This is because productivity is higher in
high land restrictions areas, as discussed earlier, and higher rainfall increases crop yield. The sign
of the instrument in the rst stage thus provides us with a way to check whether the interaction
based instrument captures the variations in historical malaria across DSDs.
4.3 Potential Objections to Identication Strategy
There are a number of possible objections to our identication scheme which we discuss below.
A legitimate concern is that the sub-district level historical malaria might proxy for the direct
eect of rainfall on the labor market, especially in the agricultural sector. To make sure that our
instrument (rainfall weighted historical malaria) does not capture the direct eect of rainfall on
the labor market, we control for rainfall in a sub-district directly in all of the IV regressions.14
In addition to rainfall, regressions control for slope (steeper slope means less standing water and
less malaria), share of paddy land in total agricultural land and a dummy indicating whether the
DSD is within 5 km of a river (land productivity). The district level xed eects are also included
to control for land and labor productivity heterogeneity. As discussed before, land productivity
as measured by yield is not lower in high land restriction areas. Evidence in Table 1 also indicates
14Since rainfall is conducive to rice cultivation, one might worry that they might aect the cropping mix in a
subdistrict. We thank Andy Foster for raising this point. To the extent crops dier in terms of their labor intensity,
it might aect demand for labor. The rainfall as control should pick up the resulting variation in labor demand
across sub-districts. As an additional check, we later report IV results that control for share of paddy land.
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that conditional on exogenous indicators of land productivity (rainfall, slope and nearness to river
dummy and district xed eects), our instrument is not correlated with crop yields. This is strong
evidence in favor of the identication scheme.
Another important objection to the identication strategy comes from the recent literature
on institutions and growth that shows that historical malaria can aect the quality of institutions
through its inuence on settler mortality (Acemoglu et al, 2001). However, it is important to
appreciate that the long-term eects of malaria on the quality of institutions emphasized in the
cross-country literature are not relevant for our identication scheme. Because identication in
our case comes from variations in historical malaria across sub-districts within a district, as we
use district xed eects.15 The relevant institutions such as legal system and enforcement of
contracts and property rights, however, are determined at the national level. As an additional
precaution, we also control for the proportion of Sinhalese population in a sub-district as a measure
of ethno-linguistic fractionalization that can potentially aect public goods provision.16 A further
concern is that historical malaria may have aected human capital of current labor force adversely
in our sample. There are good reasons to believe that this is not the case. First, and probably
the most important, is the fact that the settlement schemes brought in people from relatively
malaria free regions to the subdistricts which were abandoned because of historical malaria. As
a result, vast majority of the current population were never exposed to historical malaria in the
sub-district of their current residence (i.e, residence in 2002). Second, we exclude the cohorts that
were potentially exposed (in utero or post-natal) to historical malaria in Sri Lanka.17 Thus our
sample is not contaminated by the possibility that someone might have been exposed to historical
malaria before his/her mom resettled in a historical malaria ravaged sub-district.18 The upshot
of the above discussion is that historical malaria in a sub-district should not be correlated with
15A district as an administrative unit is similar to a county in USA.
16We, however, do not nd any evidence that ethnolinguistic fractionalization is correlated with the incidence
of land restrictions across sub-districts in Sri Lanka. A regression of proportion of land under restrictions on a
constant and share of Sinhalese population yields a coecient close to zero (-0.002) with a very low t statistic
(-0.33).
17Since malaria exposure in utero can have eects on adult health and education, we exclude cohorts born before
1950, even though nationwide malaria eradication was implemented in 1947.
18Note that the probability of such exposure is not high as malaria endemicity was much lower in the sub-districts
from where the people were resettled.
18
the health outcomes of most of the current population. Indeed, evidence in Table 2 conrms
that the interaction of historical malaria and rainfall is not correlated with the current health
conditions (measured by anemia and chronic illness/disablity). To allay the concern that historical
malaria might pick up the current malaria infections, we control for recent malaria incidence (both
Plasmodium Vivax and Plasmodium Falciparum infection rates).
Note that historical malaria can potentially aect the attitude (for example, risk preference)
of the exposed population, and it can have long-term eects on women's labor force participation
if intergenerational transmission of changes in attitude is signicant enough. But, in our sample,
such eects are not possible because the parents and grandparents of the current generation under
land restrictions were never exposed to the historical malaria in the current village of residence,
as they were resettled from relatively malaria free parts of the country. This fact also implies that
the migration network inherited by the current generation was not aected by historical malaria
in their current residence. This is important because historical malaria can have direct eects on
migration if parental generation was exposed.19
5. Empirical Results
(5.1) OLS Estimates
We start with the simple OLS results for alternative sets of controls and samples. Regressions
include a set of individual and household level controls, area-specic controls, and a dummy
for estate (tea plantation). The estate dummy captures variation in economic opportunities
particularly for women as tea estates in Sri Lanka employ primarily women workers. The distance
to the nearest city plays a double role; it represents the standard migration costs due to transport
and search, but it may also capture dierences in economic structure, as the composition of
output and pattern of crop specialization in a village economy depend on the access to urban
markets (Emran and Shilpi (2012)). The area-specic controls include share of Sinhalese (main
ethnic group in the country), number of cases of Plasmodium Vivax and Plasmodium Falciparum
infections in 2002. The set of individual and household level controls vary slightly depending on
19We thank an anonymous referee for raising these points.
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the dependent variable of regression. Most regressions also include land productivity controls such
as average rainfall, average slope, a dummy indicating whether sub-district is within 5 kilometer
of a river, and proportion of land devoted to paddy and district level xed eects. In addition to
capturing unobserved land and labor heterogeneity, the district xed eects also control for any
formal or informal institutional dierences across areas which might be relevant for labor market.
All standard errors reported in this paper are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at
DSD level.
The regressions for labor force participation are reported in columns 1 and 2, and for wage in
columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 respectively. The wage regressions correct for selection into employment
as labor force participation rate among women is about 51 percent. The estimates of Table 3
exploit heteroskedasticity for identication following a growing econometric literature that shows
that identication can be obtained without any exclusion restrictions if there is heteroskedasticity
in the participation equation (Schaner (2002), Lewbel (2012), Klein and Vella (2009)). As
shown by Schaner (2002) and Klein and Vella (2009), heteroskedasticity eectively induces an
exclusion restriction even if there is no external instrument available.20 The second approach
we take imposes explicit exclusion restriction following Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) who use
numbers of infants and toddlers as instruments for sample selection correction in female wage
equation (the corresponding OLS results are omitted for the sake of brevity).21
The specications in columns 1 and 3 of Table 3 include controls for individual and household
characteristics, a dummy for estate (mainly tea) and distance to the nearest large city but do not
include land productivity controls or district xed eects. We include individual and household
level characteristics that are expected to aect a women's reservation and actual wages; age (in
log), marital status, education level (log) and indicators of dierences in stigma eect of women's
work (religion and ethnicity). The labor force participation regression includes a squared term for
education as education is observed to have non-linear eect on participation decision. The simple
20For recent applications of heteroskedasticity based identication, see, for example, Chowdhury et al. (2014),
Emran and Hou (2013), Emran and Shilpi (2012), Emran et al. (2014), Mallick (2011).
21We, however, present the results that include number of infants and toddlers as an identifying instrument of
the selection equation as part of the robustness checks of the main IV results.
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OLS regressions indicate no signicant correlations between land restrictions and women's labor
force participation and wage. These regressions, however, do not control for any agro-climatic or
other indicators of productivity such as rainfall. Thus potential negative eect of land restrictions
may be oset by the omitted productivity eects.
The next specications (columns 2 and 4) add geographic (slope, proximity to river), agro-
climatic (rainfall), and land productivity (share of paddy land) variables to the specication in
columns 1 and 3. They also include district level xed eects. The estimated partial correlation
between land restrictions and women's labor force participation is positive, large in magnitude
(0.28) and statistically signicant at the 1 percent signicance level.22 The estimated partial
correlation (-1.42) in the case of wage is on the other hand negative and statistically signicant at
the 1 percent level. The estimates in column 2 and 4 thus provide some preliminary indication that
the omitted land and labor productivity may bias the estimates of the impact of land restrictions
on women's labor force participation and wage toward zero.
(5.2) Estimates from the Instrumental Variables Approach
The OLS regressions in Table 3 provide some interesting preliminary evidence on the eects
of land restrictions on women's labor force participation and wages. However, the estimates are
likely to be biased due to unobserved heterogeneity and measurement error. To correct for the
possible bias in the estimates in Table 3, we use the instrumental variables approach developed
in section (4) above. We use the most complete specications in columns 2 and 4 of Table 3
for the instrumental variables estimation. Table 4 reports the main results from the instrumental
variables approach. The rst row shows the IV estimates of the eects of land restrictions on
women's labor force participation and wages, and the following four rows report the rst stage
regressions and diagnostics for the relevance of the instrument.
The rst stage results show that historical malaria incidence at the subdistrict level has ex-
cellent power in explaining the variation in the incidence of land restrictions (proportion of land
under restrictions), even after district xed eects are included. The lowest Kleibergen-Paap
22The pattern of the estimates from the probit models for labor force participation are similar to the ones from
OLS and are omitted for the sake of brevity.
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F statistic for the exclusion of the instrument are 11.99 across the four IV regressions in Table
4, implying that all of the F statistics are larger than the Stock-Yogo critical value 9.08 for 10
percent maximal relative bias.23 The sign of the instrument (interaction of district malaria with
DSD rainfall) in the rst stage regressions is negative across all four regressions. As discussed
before, this can be interpreted as strong evidence that the interaction of rainfall with historical
malaria in fact captures the variation in historical malaria across DSDs (after employing district
xed eects); if the interaction represents direct productivity eects of rainfall instead, we should
have observed a positive coecient on the instrument in the rst stage regression. This provides
additional evidence that conditional on district xed eects, subdistrict rainfall, and a rich set of
controls in the IV regressions, the exclusion restriction imposed on the rainfall weighted historical
malaria is credible.
Columns (1) and (2) in the rst row of Table 4 reports the estimated causal eects of land
restrictions on women's labor force participation. The specication in column (2) adds number of
infants and toddlers as additional regressors. The estimated eect of land restrictions on women's
labor force participation is statistically signicant at the 1 percent level, and the magnitudes (1.05
and 1.04) are signicantly larger than the corresponding OLS estimates.
Columns (3) and (4) in row 1 of Table 4 present the 2SLS estimates of the eects of land
restrictions on female wage. The wage regressions include a selection term to correct for self
selection into the labor force. The specication in column 3 exploits heteroskedasticty in the
participation equation following a growing econometric literature that shows that identication
can be obtained without any external instruments when there is heteroskedasticity in the selection
equation (Schaner (2002), Lewbel (2012) and Klein and Vella (2009, 2010). Since the selection
equation is a binary choice model, one can argue that it is identied from the nonlinearity of the
normal CDF. However, it is well-appreciated in the literature that such identication is weak,
as it relies on the data variation in the tails of the distribution (Altonji et al. (2005)). When
there is heteroskedasticity, it allows us to exploit the observations from the middle part of the
23We use the critical value for 3 instruments, as Stock-Yogo (2005) do not report the critical value for 2 instru-
ments.
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distribution which is approximately linear, and thus the resulting identication is no longer weak
(for a discussion, see Klein and Vella (2009)). The specication in column 4 on the other hand
utilizes the number of infants and toddler as identifying instrument in the selection equation
following Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008).
The estimated eect of land restrictions on female wage as reported in column (3) is negative,
numerically substantial (-1.54) and statistically signicant at the 5 percent level (row 1). The
estimate using the alternative selection correction scheme reported in column 4 also suggests
statistically signicant (at 1 percent level) and negative (-1.78) eect of land restrictions on
female wage. The IV estimates of the eects of land restrictions on female wage are numerically
(in absolute magnitude) larger than the OLS estimates reported in Table 3 (column 4). The IV
estimates for both labor force participation and wage seem to justify the worry that the OLS
estimates are signicantly biased toward zero due to omitted variables and measurement error.
We also perform a variety of robustness checks for the IV results in Table 4, but we omit the
results for the sake of brevity (available in an online appendix to this paper). The robustness
exercises deal with the following issues: (i) potential correlation between unobserved land pro-
ductivity and farm size,24 (ii) possible eects of malaria eradication in 1947 on the population
and hence density of economic activity, (iii) broader measure of relevant urban market for a sub-
district, and (iv) heterogeneity in non-farm opportunities, and investments in land improvements
across subdistricts.
(5.3) Mechanisms: Collateral for Credit, Insecure Property Rights, or Migration
Costs?
The results discussed so far provide strong evidence that the land market restrictions aect
women's labor force participation and wages signicantly. The evidence is consistent with the
theoretical analysis in section (2) above that identies rural-urban migration as the main channel
through which the land market restrictions work.
The results reported so far are, however, not consistent with the predictions from the two
24This point was raised by Andrew Foster.
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other alternative mechanisms discussed in the introduction. First, consider the implications of
an important credit and interest rate channel for the land market restrictions. A lower access to
formal credit can have conicting eects on the demand for labor. On the one hand, a higher
interest rate faced in the informal sector would lead to capital-labor substitutions in favor of
relatively cheaper labor, and thus increase the demand for labor in a sub-district with higher
proportion of land under restrictions.25 The equilibrium wage in this case will be higher along
with higher level of labor force participation in the rural areas. The fact that we nd very robust
evidence of a negative eect of land restrictions on equilibrium wage casts strong doubts on the
relevance of such interest rate channel in our case. However, at least in some cases, the capital
and labor may be complementary. For example, if lower access to credit reduces the adoption of
new seed technology in agriculture, this might reduce demand for labor.26 More generally, a lack
of credit and higher interest rate will aect investment adversely and also can lead to failure and
exit of non-farm business in a village. Such negative eects at the extensive margin will reduce
the demand for labor. In this case, we would observe a reduction in both wage and labor force
participation by women. Our evidence that labor force participation in fact increases after land
restrictions thus contradicts this particular credit mechanism.
If land market restrictions create uncertainty regarding property rights, then women would
need to stay back home to guard and protect property rights as in Field (2007). In the context of
our model, this can be interpreted as higher productivity in home work, which now also includes
guard labor. More insecurity in property rights would reduce women's labor force participation
and push up wages in the village labor market. Our evidence on both wages and participation
contradict both of these predictions.
(5.4) Additional Evidence on Migration Mechanism
In this section, we provide additional evidence that the eects of land restrictions on women's
labor force participation and wage are due to the increased costs of migration arising from re-
25The farmers would not nd it protable to adopt labor saving technologies such as tractors and thrashing
machines.
26Most of the existing evidence shows that the green revolution increases demand for labor.
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strictions in the land market. We provide several pieces of evidence that relates to the eects of
higher migration costs.27 First, we nd that propensity of outmigration is lower across districts
(see Figure 1 based on population census 2012) and proportion of split households where some
members are left behind to hold on to the land is higher (see Figure 2 based on HIES 2002) in
subdistricts with land restrictions. The census did not provide the out-migration data by gender.
To check if female migration is also less in the areas with higher land restrictions, we use census
data on female share in total population. The census data show that share of female in total
population is higher when land restrictions are higher (Figure 3). This is true if we focus only
on adult women (graph omitted for brevity). Using population census data from 2002 and 2012,
we compute the change in female share of population for the same age cohort (15-49 year old in
2002 and 25-59 year old in 2012). Figure 4 plots this variable against proportion of land under
restrictions. The positive slope conrms that more female are staying back in areas with more
land under restrictions. Third, female share in the labor force {dened from HIES 2002 data { is
also positively correlated with the incidence of land restrictions (see Figure 5). Taken together,
these can be interpreted as strong direct evidence in favor of the proposition that women stay
back in the village in response to higher migration costs arising from land restrictions. Finally,
using HIES 2002 data, we nd that farm size is negatively correlated with land restrictions, as
one would expect if more women (and possibly some men) stay back in the village facing higher
migration costs (Figure 6).
We also nd suggestive evidence that support the model where heterogeneity in labor force
participation and the consequences of higher migration costs depend on productivity in home
goods production. Due to cultural norms, women are responsible for providing home goods in
Sri Lanka, and this gender role creates productivity dierences between male and female in home
goods production. It is also common that the older women bear most of the responsibility for
home, and accumulate advantages due to learning eects and experience. If home production is
important as postulated in our model, then increased migration costs due to land restrictions will
27We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting these additional test for the migration mechanism. As
mentioned before that the migration mechanism has prediction for farm size was also noted by Andrew Foster.
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aect the men much less than the women, and among women, the eect will be smaller on the
younger women. In an online appendix (see Table A.3), we report evidence on dierential eects
of land market restrictions across gender and dierent age cohorts of women. The evidence is
consistent with an important role of home production heterogeneity.
(5.5) Economic Signicance
Are the estimated eects economically important enough to warrant attention? A 10 percent
increase in the land under restrictions starting from a mean incidence level of restrictions increases
women's labor force participation by about 2.3 percent according to the estimate in Table 4. The
mean level of land restrictions in our data set is about 11 percent, thus a 10 percent increase
in the land under restrictions is equivalent to an increase of about 1 percentage point for an
average sub-district. A close to 2.3 percent increase in the labor force participation due to a 1
percentage point increase in the land restrictions is not a small eect given that the mean labor
force participation rate for women in our sample is 51 percent. The estimates for female wage
imply that a one percentage point increase in land under restrictions reduces wage by about 1.7
percent. The average annual real wage for women is Rs. 51133 in our sample. A 1 percentage
point increase in land under restrictions decreases annual wage by Rs.866 (evaluated at the mean
so that the area of land under restrictions goes up from 11 percent to 12 percent). The ocial
poverty line annual expenditure for 2002 was Rs.17076, and food poverty line was Rs. 11676. The
reduction of wage due to a percentage point increase in land under restrictions accounts for 5.1
percent of ocial poverty line expenditure and 7.4 percent of food poverty line expenditure. The
results thus indicate that the eect of land market restrictions on female wage is substantial.
6. Conclusions
This paper examines the eects of land market restrictions on female labor force participation
and wages in a rural labor market. The existing literature emphasizes two channels through
which land restrictions aect economic outcomes of a household: the collateral value of land,
and insecurity of property rights. Our theoretical analysis focuses on an alternative mechanism
where land restrictions increase costs of migration. In a model where women dier in terms of
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their productivity in home goods production, we show that land restrictions lower equilibrium
wage, but increase labor force participation rate. This evidence contradicts both the collateral
and insecure property rights mechanisms.
We use a historical quasi experiment in land policy in Sri Lanka to estimate the eects of
land market restrictions on the local labor market. The IV estimates that exploit the historical
natural experiment show that the eect of land restrictions on women's labor force participation
is numerically substantial and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level. According to the
IV estimates, when the land restrictions increase by 1 percentage point (starting from a mean
level of restrictions), it increases women's labor force participation by close to 2.3 percent. The
corresponding estimate is 1.7 percent reduction in the wage for women. The results also suggest
a greater burden of land market restriction on older women, and a much lower eect on men.
To the best of our knowledge, the theoretical and empirical analysis presented in this paper is
the rst attempt in economics literature to understand the eects of land market restrictions on
women's labor force participation and wage in rural areas of a developing country.
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   Table 1: Relationship between historical malaria and current productivity (yield) 
  
        
  Rice Cassava Banana Ground Nut Other Oilseeds 
Proportion of Area Under 
LDO 1,589** -1,513 -1,645 843.5*** -314.1 
  (2.058) (-0.736) (-1.417) (3.593) (-0.275) 
Malaria Incidence*rainfall -0.386 -14.24 -2.003 -0.574 -1.77 
  (-0.105) (-1.541) (-0.366) (-0.400) (-0.325) 
Observations 118 90 98 57 101 
Note: Regressions control for rainfall, average slope, proportion of irrigated land and dummy for within 5 km of a 
river. 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 2: Land under Restrictions, Historical Malaria and Health Status 
 
      
 
Anemia among non-pregnant women 
% suffering Chronic 
Illness/disability 
  Mild/Moderate Severe Any Male Female All 
Proportion of Area Under LDO -27.82 1.859 -25.96 -4.912 -9.060 6.093 
  (-1.017) (1.139) (-0.966) (-0.576) (-1.474) (0.372) 
Malaria Incidence*rainfall -0.240 1.05e-02 -0.230 7.30e-03 -1.48e-02 3.79e-02 
  (-1.626) (1.117) (-1.581) (0.150) (-0.397) (0.409) 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 3: Land market restrictions, Female Labor Force Participation and Wages 
OLS Regression Results 
 
Labor Force 
Participation Log(Real Annual wage) 
  1 2 3 4 
Proportion of area under LDO -0.0148 0.280*** -0.240 -1.424*** 
  (-0.150) (2.752) (-1.058) (-6.931) 
Travel Time to Large City 0.0187*** 0.00944* -0.0594*** -0.0512*** 
 
(3.862) (1.911) (-5.235) (-3.821) 
Selection Term 
  
1.032*** 2.474*** 
      (4.804) (9.722) 
Observations 10,850 10,850 2,918 2,918 
Individual/household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District Fixed Effect, Area Characteristics No Yes No Yes 
All regressions include individual's age, education, marital status, and dummies for household's religion/ethnicity 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the sub-district level (DSD) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
Table 4: Land market restrictions, Female Labor force participation and Wages 
IV Regression Results 
 
Labor Force Participation Log(Real Annual wage) 
  1 2 3 4 
Proportion of Area Under LDO 1.046*** 1.032*** -1.541** -1.778*** 
  (2.658) (2.657) (-2.308) (-2.672) 
First stage Regressions 
    Malaria*Average Rainfall -0.0439*** -0.0440*** -0.0433*** -0.0425*** 
  (-3.463) (-3.465) (-3.656) (-3.587) 
Relevance of Instruments 
    Kleibergen-Paap/Angrist-Pischke F 11.99 12.01 13.37 12.87 
Stock-Yogo 10% max. rel. IV bias 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 
Controls 
    Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household Composition No Yes No Yes 
Area characteristics, District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(1) All regressions include full set of regressors as in columns (2) and (4) of Table 3. 
(2) Column 2 includes household composition (no. of infant and kids) as controls 
(3) Selection term in column 3 is defined in terms of heterocedasticity in the participation equation 
(4) Selection term in column 4 is defined using numbers of infants and kids as exogenous controls in participation 
regression. 
(5) Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected for clustering at sub-district (DSD) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure 1: Proportion of Land under Restrictions 
and Out-Migration: Population Census 2012 
 
Figure 3: Proportion of Land under Restrictions 
and share of female in total population, 2012 
 
Figure 4: Proportion of Land under Restrictions 
and change in female share in total population 
for same age cohort (15-49 in 2002), 2002-2012 
 
 
Figure 5: Proportion of Land under Restrictions 
and female share in labor force, 2002 (HIES) 
 
Figure 6: Proportion of Land under Restrictions 
and Farm Size, 2002 (HIES) 
 
 
Figure 2: Proportion of Land under Restrictions 
and split households, 2002 (HIES) 
 
 
Online Appendix: Not for Publication
IV Estimates: Robustness Checks
In this subsection we report a number of robustness checks for the IV estimates re-
ported in Table 4. Table A.2 reports the results from the robustness checks. The upper
panel reports the robustness checks for labor force participation and lower panel for wage
regressions. All of the estimates for labor force participation in Tables 5 are based on the
specication in column (1) of Table 4. For wages, the specication corresponds to column
3 of Table 4.
The rst robustness check deals with the issue of potential correlation between farm size
and unobserved land productivity in a sub-district.1 If productivity varies systematically
with farm size, then it can aect labor demand and hence labor force participation and
wages directly. The IV regression in column (1) of Table A.2 controls directly for farm size
and results indicate no signicant change in the estimated eects of land restrictions on
labor force participation and wages.
A related concern is that historical malaria and its eradication in 1947 may have aected
the population of a sub-district through migration and re-settlement. Such population
movements may have aected the density of economic activities and hence our dependent
variables. Note that the regressions already control for travel time to the larger cities which
is a reliable predictor of density of economic activities. In addition we include population
density of a sub-district in an IV regression, and the results reported in column 2 of Table
5 indicate little change in parameter estimates.
In the IV regressions reported Table 4, travel time to the nearest large city (with
population of 100 thousands or more) is used to control for the eects of remoteness from
urban markets. One might argue that focusing on a single city (even if the largest) may
not capture the extent of the market households in a village have access to. Column 3
1Note that farm size may not be an appropriate control because it can be the outcome of land restrictions.
As land restrictions aect land/labor ratio, it can aect the farm size in a subdistrict.
1
of Table A.2 reports the IV estimates from a specication that includes urban population
within 5 hours of travel time as a measure of the relevant market. The estimated eects of
land restrictions are again nearly unchanged for both labor force participation and wage
regressions.
Column (4) of Table A.2 addresses the question whether the negative eect of land
restrictions can partially reect heterogeneity in the availability of non-farm opportunities.
The estimate, after controlling for the share of non-farm employment in a village (PSU),
is 1.15 (with a P-value of 0.00) for labor force participation and -1.35 (p-value=0.05) for
wage. One should however interpret these estimates with caution, as non-farm activities
are likely to respond to the incidence of land restrictions, and thus may be a `bad control'
a la Angrist and Pischke (2009), when the focus is on estimating the causal eects of land
restrictions on equilibrium wages.
An additional concern is that eradication of historical malaria in 1947 may have in-
duced private investment in land improvement aecting labor demand in post-eradication
periods.2 This, however, has not been the case in Sri Lanka. In the case of lands under re-
strictions which were distributed under the Land Development Ordinance Act, government
invested massively in the development of large-scale irrigation systems as well as other land
improvements prior to distributing these lands to private individuals. Treating all irriga-
tion investment as private investment, we include proportion of agricultural land irrigated
in a subdistrict as an additional control in the IV regression. The results in column 5 of
Table A.2 again show some change in the estimates of the eect of land restrictions on
female labor force participation and wages though in opposite direction. Even after inclu-
sion of irrigation, the estimates suggest numerically and statistically signicant impacts of
land restrictions on female labor force participation and wages. As in the case of non-farm
employment, irrigation qualies as a `bad' control since land restriction may aect private
2It is important to appreciate that positive land or labor productivity improvements cannot explain our
result that land restrictions have a negative eect on wages; such productivity increases would result in
higher wages.
2
investment in irrigation directly.
Finally we check the sensitivity of the estimates with respect to the inclusion/exclusion
of DSDs with very high incidence of land restrictions; are the estimates driven by a few
outliers in the right tail? Column (6) of Table A.2 reports the estimates from a sample
that excludes sub-districts with proportion of land under restrictions more than 30 percent.
The restricted sample has 212 DSDs and thus loses 30 out of a 242 DSDs in the full sample.
The estimated eects are signicant at 5 percent or less and much larger in magnitudes
(1.73 for labor force participation, and -2.01 for wage).
The results in Tables A.2 are very reassuring; although the precise numerical magnitudes
of the estimated eects of land restrictions on women's labor force participation and wages
vary somewhat across dierent specications, the estimates for the full sample fall within
reasonably tight bounds. The range of estimates are [0.85, 1.15] for women's labor force
participation, [{1.39, -1.56] for female wage.
Suggestive Evidence on the Relevance of Home Goods Production
The variation in labor force participation in our model comes from the heterogeneity
in productivity of home good production. While we do not have data to analyze this het-
erogeneity directly, we provide two pieces of supporting evidence. In a traditional South
Asian society such as Sri Lanka, women bear a disproportionate share of home production
with minimal participation from men. One can model this as a heterogeneity in produc-
tivity of home production with i larger for women than men.
3 An implication of this
heterogeneity is that men will be more likely to migrate than women after imposition of
land restrictions, and as a consequence, impact of land restrictions should be smaller for
men compared to women. The rst column in Table A.3 reports the IV results for men's
wage using a regression specication similar to column 3 of Table 4 in the main text.4
3Although we cast the heterogeneity in the production technology, one could alternatively interpret
the model as one involving preference heterogeneity where i) is a preference parameter that varies across
households and the production of home goods is done with the same technology.
4The selection term is not included in this regression as labor participation is nearly universal among
adult male in Sri Lanka.
3
The estimated coecient of proportion of land under restriction (-0.978) is much smaller
in absolute magnitude compared with that for women (-1.54). This is consistent with a
model where land restrictions impose less burden on men due to heterogeneity in home
good production. Note that labor force participation by men is close to 100 percent, thus
we do not report estimates for them.
To the extent older women are more responsible for home production { as is the cus-
tom in much of South Asia including Sri Lanka { one would expect productivity in home
production to be dierent between older and younger women. Older women are likely to
be more productivity in home production because of learning by doing and accumulated
experience. Having an older woman in the household also means less burden of provision
of home goods for younger women allowing them to participate and spend more time in
outside work. This in turn implies that migration costs imposed by land restrictions will
be lower for younger women compared with older ones. If this is so, then we expect land
restrictions to have larger impact on labor force participation of older women. As to impact
on wage, a change in labor supply by anyone regardless of age could have general equilib-
rium eect particularly if there is no segmentation in the labor market in terms of types of
task performed by dierent age cohorts. If, on the other hand, older and younger women
perform dierentiated tasks in the labor market allowing some degree of labor market seg-
mentation, then we expect larger impact of land restriction on wages of older women as
well. To check these possibilities, we split the female sample into two age groups: older
women [age > 40 years] and younger women [25-40 years]. Columns 2 and 3 of Table A.3
report the IV results for labor force participation and columns 4 and 5 report that for
wages. The results in columns 2 and 3 of Table A.4 are interesting: the estimated eect
land restrictions on labor force participation becomes smaller for the younger women. The
land restrictions have statistically signicant and positive eects on the participation rates
of both groups of women, but the magnitude of eect is larger for older women (1.33)
compared with younger women (0.86). The pattern of the estimates between age groups is
consistent with what one would expect when older women play a greater role in the provi-
4
sion of home goods. For wages, the IV results suggest signicant negative eects for both
groups, and the absolute magnitude of the eect is slightly larger for the older women. The
results for wages are consistent with the case where tasks done by older and younger women
in the labor market are only mildly dierentiated. The robustness checks (not reported
here for brevity) shows that the patterns reported above hold for other age cohorts as well.
The labor force participation pattern reported in Table A.3 also provides convincing
evidence that the estimates of eects of land restrictions are not picking up any omitted
intergenerational health eect emanating from transmission of parental exposure to malaria.
One would expect health of older age cohort to have been aected more adversely due to
intergenerational transmission of historical malaria's eect on parental health. To the
extent bad health aects female labor force participation adversely, one should expect to
nd a smaller eect of land restrictions on labor force participation for older age cohorts
compared with that of younger age cohorts if our identication scheme is compromised by
such intergenerational health eects. The results in Table A.3 are quite the opposite. This,
however, may not be surprising to a keen observer of impressive achievements in health,
nutrition and education across the board during the post eradication period, thus osetting
any lingering intergenerational eects (for a discussion, please see for example, Sen (1981)).
5
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics 
 
      
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Labor force participation rate  0.51 1 0.50 
Female Wage (annual in rupees) 51132.75 36962.05 44145.32 
Proportion of Area Under LDO Leases 0.11 0.05 0.14 
Travel Time to Large City (hour) 2.60 1.99 2.43 
Share of Sinhalese in population 0.86 0.93 0.18 
Malaria incidence (spleen rate) 22.77 12.20 20.71 
P.Vivax (1000) 0.05 0.01 0.11 
P.Fac. (1000) 0.01 0.00 0.03 
Rainfall (000 metre) 2412.32 2268.71 800.49 
Slope (%) 10.74 7.38 9.09 
River within 5 km (yes=1) 0.35 0.00 0.48 
Share of land allocated to paddy 0.36 0.29 0.29 
Age (Year) 37.29 37 7.62 
Education Level (year) 8.30 10 3.82 
Married (yes=1) 0.83 1 0.38 
Number of Infant/Toddlers (< 1 year) 0.38 0 0.61 
Number of Infant/Toddlers (1-5year) 0.94 1 1.02 
Christian (yes=1) 0.05 0 0.22 
Muslim (yes=1) 0.05 0 0.21 
Buddist (yes=1) 0.83 1 0.38 
Moor (yes=1) 0.05 0 0.21 
Tamil (yes=1) 0.08 0 0.28 
Estate (yes=1) 0.08 0 0.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2: Land Market Restrictions, Female Labor Force participation and Wages: Robustness Checks for 
IV Results: Estimates from 2SLS 
 
            
 
Labor Force Participation 
 
Additional Controls   
 
Farm  Size Populaion Pop. in 5 hrs  Non-farm Irrigation LDO less 
  
Density travel time Share 
 
than 30% 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Area Under LDO 1.042*** 0.971** 1.061*** 1.149*** 0.847** 1.732*** 
  (2.639) (2.433) (2.743) (2.802) (2.236) (3.245) 
Instrument Strength  
      Angrist Pischke F 11.98 11.27 13.24 11.83 10.84 9.326 
Stock-Yogo 10% bias 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 
No. Of Observations 10850 10850 10850 10850 10850 9767 
 
Log(Real Wage) 
 Area Under LDO -1.556** -1.481** -1.511** -1.351** -1.388* -2.014** 
  (-2.339) (-2.192) (-2.273) (-1.960) (-1.881) (-2.343) 
Instrument Strength  
      Angrist Pischke F 13.50 12.53 15.32 13.18 11.49 12.25 
Stock-Yogo 10% bias 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 
No. Of Observations 2,918 2,918 2,918 2,918 2,918 2,708 
(1) All regressions include full set of regressors as in columns (2) and (4) of Table 3. 
(2) Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected for clustering at sub-district (DSD) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table A.3: Female Labor Force Participation and Male and Female Wages 
 
Male 
Female Labor Force 
Participation Log( Real Wage) 
 
Log(real 
Older 
Women 
Younger 
Women 
Older 
Women 
Younger 
Women 
 
Wage) (age=>40yr)  (25-40yr) (age=>40yr)  (25-40yr) 
    2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Proportion of Area Under LDO -0.978* 1.327*** 0.855** -1.656** -1.344* 
  (-1.942) (2.818) (2.261) (-2.109) (-1.773) 
Instrument Strength  
     Kleibergen-Paap/Angrist Pischke F 10.95 12.59 11.24 11.83 13.14 
Stock-Yogo 10% max. rel. IV bias 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 
No. of observation 6,492 4,352 7,017 1,205 1,867 
 (1) All regressions include full set of regressors as in column (3) of Table 4. 
(2) Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected for clustering at sub-district (DSD) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
